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Market Structure and Racial Earnings:

Evidence from Job-Changers

By JACQUELINE AGESA, RICHARD U. AGESA, AND GARY A. HOOVER*

industries. The research methods resemble

In his seminal contribution, Gary Becker

(1957) suggests that rents in noncompetitive

those of Janice F. Madden's (1987) study of

industries provide employers with the latitude

cost of job displacement by gender.

to engage in earnings discrimination. Implicit in

If noncompetitive industries engage in racial

this theory, is that white workers in noncompet-

earnings discrimination, then wages of white

itive industries would capture a disproportion-

workers in these industries would be above the

ate share of monopoly rents (excessive wages)

market wage; wages of minority workers would

relative to their minority counterparts.1

be below. Therefore, we would expect that

Previous studies that have examined market

white workers who leave noncompetitive indus-

structure and earnings discrimination utilize a

tries experience substantially greater earnings

cross-sectional approach, which compares the

loss than if they had remained in noncompeti-

racial wage gap in highly concentrated noncom-

tive industries relative to their minority coun-

petitive industries with the gap in less concen-

terparts. Similarly, we would expect greater

trated competitive industries, yielding mixed

earnings gains for white workers from joining

results (see James Peoples [1994] for a review

noncompetitive industries, than from remaining

of this literature). However, noncompetitive in-

in competitive industries, relative to minorities.

dustries pay higher wages and may attract more-

Moreover, this would indicate that whites in

productive workers. A shortcoming of this

noncompetitive industries are disproportion-

approach, therefore, is that unmeasured pro-

ately the beneficiaries of labor rent-sharing rel-

ductivity differences between workers in non-

ative to their minority co-workers.

competitive and competitive industries could

We utilize wage-change equations to exam-

partially explain differences in earnings under

ine earnings shifts for whites and minorities

different market structures. Consequently, these

stemming from a job switch to a different mar-

analyses may provide distorted estimates of the

ket structure. Additionally for each racial group,

relationship between market concentration and

wage equations of workers before and after

racial earnings.

the job change are used to calculate difference-

This study augments the above literature by

in-differences estimates of wage change as a result

investigating the relationship between market

of the job switch. The findings contradict the

concentration and racial earnings using data sets

stated hypothesis: gains in minority wages from

that rectify the measurement problem of pro-

joining noncompetitive industries and losses in

ductivity differences between workers under

wages from leaving are larger, suggesting that (for

opposing market structures. Specifically, two

minorities) the higher, less discriminatory wages

samples of workers who have changed employ-

of union employment in noncompetitive indus-

ment are used to examine earnings by race of

tries outweigh employer discrimination in non-

workers in pre- and post-employment-change

union, noncompetitive industries.

I. Data and Methodology

* J. Agesa and R. U. Agesa: Division of Finance and

This study uses individual data from two

Economics, Marshall University, 400 Hal Greer Blvd., Hun-

tington, WV 25755 (e-mail: agesajr@marshall.edu and

sources. The first is the 1984-1998 biannual

agesa@marshall.edu, respectively); Hoover: Department
Displaced Worker Survey (DWS) supplement

of Economics, University of Alabama, Box 870224, Tus-

to the Current Population Survey (CPS). This

caloosa, AL 35487-0224 (e-mail: ghoover@cba.ua.edu).

constructed data set consists of workers aged
J. Agesa thanks the Ford Foundation for financial support.

1 The term "minority" indicates nonwhite workers.

16 and older who were displaced from and
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reemployed in manufacturing industries, yield-

ing a sample of 274 minority and 2,135 white

weighing the industry value of shipments. A

switching regression technique was used to bi-

workers. An advantage of using displaced

furcate employees into high-concentration, non-

workers in measuring wage change is that, be-

competitive industries and low-concentration,

cause job change is involuntary (exogenous), it

competitive industries. The critical concentra-

is not the result of workers' expectations about

tion ratio was taken to be 40 percent. The CPI,

the availability of better jobs. A disadvantage,

used to deflate pre- and post-employment earn-

however, is that only a fraction of survey appli-

cants provide pre-displacement earnings, result-

ing in the small sample sizes.

ings to 1985 dollars, was taken from Economic

Report of the President 1998 (Council of Eco-

nomic Advisers, 1998).

The second source of data is matched sam-

ples of manufacturing workers in the CPS

Outgoing Rotation Groups (ORG's) from

1984 to 1998. A unique feature of the ORG's

The specification employed resembles previ-

ous studies of wage change after a job switch

(Henry Farber, 1993). However, separate equa-

tions are used to estimate wages of minorities

is that workers appear in the survey twice (12

and whites, allowing a different structure of

months apart). Past researchers have used this

real-wage change for the two groups, specified

feature to create panel data of workers; how-

as follows:

ever, a disadvantage of using the constructed

CPS panel is that some job switches may be

endogenous. Nevertheless, Barry Hirsch and

(1) AWi =aXi + b(NC_C) + c(NC_C)

David Macpherson (1998) argue that the sym-

metry in wage change of entering and leaving

+ d(C_NC) + Ei

the tested group (in our case, noncompetitive

markets) is evidence of the relative unimpor-

tance of endogenous switching.2 This match-

where A Wi is the change in the log of real

ing procedure yields 1,632 minority and

weekly wages from pre- to post-employment

12,762 white workers who have changed em-

ployment over the 12 months between survey

in 1985 dollars. The vector X includes indi-

vidual and industry controls that determine

wage change. Using the DWS, vector X in-

appearances.

Bridged to each data set of individual work-

cludes age and its square, years of tenure in

ers are measures of industry characteristics from

the pre-displacement job, six dummies for

the 1987 and 1992 Census of Manufacturers

educational attainment, three dummies indi-

(Bureau of the Census, 1989, 1994). Industry

cating region of employment, and four dum-

characteristics from the 1987 Census were used to

mies indicating pre- and post-occupational

describe a worker's pre-employment-change in-

group. Other individual controls include dum-

dustry, if the worker's first job ended before

1992, while the 1992 Census was used for all

occurring thereafter. Characteristics of the post-

mies for full- and part-time status in pre- and

post-employment, gender, and marital status.

Industry variables are included in X to control

employment industry were assigned similarly.

for the effects of changes in industry charac-

Industry characteristics include the pre- and

teristics from the pre- to the post-employment

post-change capital-to-labor ratio (KIL = [in-

industry on earnings change for each racial

dustry gross book value of plant and equip-

group. They include the change in the capital-

ment]/[industry employment]) and plant size

to-labor ratio and the change in plant size.

(= [industry employment]/[number of establish-

Dummies that account for the change in

ments]). Four firm concentration ratios, also

market structure include NC_C, for workers

taken from the Census, were converted from

who moved from noncompetitive to compet-

four-digit to three-digit SIC industry coding by

itive industries. Similarly, the other market-

structure dummies are NC_NC and C_NC,

with workers moving from competitive to

2 For each racial group, the symmetry of wage change is

competitive industries as the base group. The

illustrated by the relative equality of wage differences (in

coefficient on each variable captures the efabsolute value) of workers leaving and entering noncom-

petitive markets (see columns b and d of Table 2).

fect of that variable on earnings changes for
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TABLE 1-WAGE CHANGE OF INDIVIDUALS WHO
(1)] using the DWS sample. An increase in plant

CHANGED EMPLOYMENT
size from the displacement to the reemployment

industry significantly decreases earnings loss for

DWS Matched CPS

whites, while it insignificantly increases the loss

Independent White Minority White Minority

for minorities.3 Of central importance are the re-

variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

sults for the change in market-structure dummies.

KIL -0.008 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004

For minorities whose initial employment is in

(-0.94) (-0.16) (-0.57) (0.05)

competitive industries, joining a noncompetitive
Plant size -0.032t 0.004 -0.002t -0.003

industry significantly reduces earnings loss by 68
(2.1) (0.12) (1.8) (0.97)

percentage points relative to remaining in compet-

NC_NC -0.051 -0.217 -0.011 0.011

(-0.69) (-1.1) (0.89) (0.31)
itive industries [see coefficients on C_NC, in col-

NC_C -0.181 -0.788t -0.019 -0.014
umn (ii)]. By contrast, joining a noncompetitive

(-1.0) (-1.7) (1.0) (0.31)

industry insignificantly reduces earnings loss of

C_NC -0.093 -1.14t -0.022 -0.075S

whites by 8.8 percentage points relative to remain(-0.53) (-1.8) (1.42) (1.7)

ing in a competitive industry [see coefficients on

Dummies for:

NC_C, in column (i)]. The t test of the difference
Previous years yes yes no no

between the NC_NC and NC_C variables for
of tenure

Geographic yes yes yes yes

white displaced workers fails to reject the hy-

region
pothesis of equal wage loss for noncompetitive-

Full or part time yes yes yes yes
industry non-leavers and leavers; the t statistic is

Human capital yes yes yes yes

-0.78. The t test of the difference between mi-

Year in sample yes yes yes yes

nority non-leavers and leavers in noncompetitive
Occupation yes yes yes yes

industries just barely fails to reject the hypothesis

Union status no no yes yes

of equal wage loss between the two groups, yield-

R 2: 0.328 0.482 0.023 0.021

ing a t statistic of -1.5.

Sample size: 2,135 274 12,762 1,632

Columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 1 present the

Notes: NC indicates noncompetitive, and C indicates competitive industry. Thus

wage-change estimates using the CPS matched

NC_C inidicates that the worker switched from a noncompetitive to a compet-

panel. An increase in plant size for whites
itive industry. The other two variants of pre- and post-job change in market

structure follow a similar pattern, with workers switching from competitive to
significantly reduces earnings loss by 0.03

competitive industries as the base group. KIL is the capital-to-labor ratio.

percentage points, while it insignificantly influNumbers in parentheses are t statistics.

Source: Displaced-worker data were taken from the biannual Displaced
ences wage changes for minorities. The market-

Worker Supplement to the CPS, 1984-1998. Matched CPS manufacturing-

structure dummies are insignificant in both the

worker data were taken from the CPS ORG, 1984-1998.

t Statistically significant at the 10-percent level.
white and minority equations, with the ex-

ception of the significant coefficient on C_NC,

for minority workers moving from competitive

that racial group. The coefficients on the change-

to noncompetitive industries. Indeed, joining a

in-market-structure dummies are key because they

noncompetitive industry significantly reduces

measure the earnings change in moving to and

earnings loss for minorities, by 7.2 percentage

from noncompetitive and competitive industries,

points. Moreover, earnings change for minori-

relative to workers who stay in competitive indus-

ties in the matched CPS panel and the DWS

tries, for each racial group.

indicates earnings gains in noncompetitive in-

Using the constructed CPS panel, the vector

dustries (relative to competitive industries) that

X differs from the above in that it does not

are not a result of increased human-capital in-

include a control for years of tenure in the

vestment. These findings suggest that minorities

previous occupation. However, dummies for

are beneficiaries of labor rent-sharing.

union status in pre- and post-change employ-

Next, the CPS ORG panels are divided

ment are included.

into the four variants of the job-switch

market-structure groupings (NC_C, NC-NC,

II. Findings

Columns (i) and (ii) of Table 1 present the
3The conversion into percentage differentials is given by

earnings change for each racial group [equation

(ecoefficient - 1) X 100.
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TABLE 2-DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES
point larger gains than those in competitive

OF WAGES (IN PERCENTAGE POINTS)
industries.

A. Workers Leaving Noncompetitive-Industry Jobs:

III. Conclusions

NC-NC NC_C

Racial group (a) (b) (b) - (a)
Past empirical testing of the relationship

Minority (M) 6.41 -12.51 -18.92

between market structure and racial earnings

White (W) 5.07 -3.77 -8.84
has involved two sources of distorting mea-

surement error: error resulting from un-

Difference
observed differences between workers in

(M - W): 1.34 -8.74

noncompetitive and competitive industries

and error resulting from unobserved differB. Workers Leaving Comnpetitive-Industry Jobs:

ences between white and minority workers.

C_C C_NC

This study utilized two data sets of employ-

Racial group (c) (d) (d) - (c)

ment-changers to examine workers' earnings

Minority (M) 1.16 15.16 14.00
under opposing market structure, thereby

White (W) -2.03 5.52 7.55

eliminating the first error source. Elimination

of the latter would be daunting because it

Difference

would entail observing workers' earnings if
(M - W): 3.16 9.64

they were white and if they were minority.

Note: See notes to Table 1 for definitions of NC_NC,

Our findings provide evidence of larger mi-

NC_C, C_C, and C_NC.
nority wage gains from entering noncompet-

Source: CPS ORG panel, 1984-1998.

itive industries and greater loss from leaving,

relative to whites. These findings may contra-

dict the hypothesized relationship between ra-

C_C, and C_NC) for each racial group. Sep-

cial earnings and market structure for two

arate wage equations are estimated for each

reasons. First, noncompetitive industries are

sample before and after the job change. Such

more unionized than competitive industries.

a procedure removes the fixed-effects restric-

Second, union employment offers higher

tion on earnings changes for workers entering

and more standardized (i.e., less discrimina-

and leaving noncompetitive industries and al-

tory) wages than does nonunion employment

lows a separate earnings structure before and

(Richard Freeman, 1980). Thus, minority

after the job switch and by market structure.

wage gains in entering noncompetitive in-

Further, the procedure allows difference-in-

dustries are large because the effects of the

differences estimates of the difference in

increased likelihood of a higher, less discrim-

wage change for minorities and whites enter-

inatory union wage outweighs employers'

ing and leaving noncompetitive industries.

increased latitude to practice wage discrimi-

Findings of the difference-in-differences pro-

nation in nonunion noncompetitive employ-

cedure are presented in Table 2. Earnings losses

ment. This interpretation is consistent with

for minorities and whites leaving noncompeti-

past cross-sectional findings of large racial

tive industries are 12.51 and 3.77 percentage

wage gaps in nonunion employment in non-

points respectively. Further, leaving a noncom-

competitive industries and small, insignificant

petitive industry causes a 18.92-percentage-

racial wage gaps for union members (Peoples,

point greater earnings loss for minorities and a

1994).

8.84-percentage-point greater loss for whites
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